Experimentos económicos en el mercado laboral

  1. Natalia Jiménez 1
  1. 1 Universidad Pablo de Olavide
    info

    Universidad Pablo de Olavide

    Sevilla, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02z749649

Revista:
Economía industrial

ISSN: 0422-2784

Año de publicación: 2017

Título del ejemplar: Economía experimental

Número: 403

Páginas: 71-80

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Economía industrial

Resumen

Este trabajo presenta un análisis de los mercados laborales desde la perspectiva de la metodología experimental. El modelo más empleado es el llamado juego de intercambio de obsequios. Para hacer la revisión de esta literatura nos centraremos en tres áreas. Primero analizaremos distintos tipos de incentivos que se consideran en la teoría de contratos y sus efectos sobre los beneficios. En segundo lugar, exploraremos las dificultades que pueden surgir cuando hay comparación y discriminación salarial. Por último, examinaremos las consecuencias de la regulación gubernamental en el mercado de trabajo.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • ABELER, J., ALTMANN, S., KUBE S. y WIBRAL M. (2010). «Gift Exchange and Workers’ Fairness Concerns: When Equality Is Unfair». Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, nº 6, pp. 1299-1324.
  • AKERLOF, G.A. (1982): «Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange». The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 97, nº 4, pp. 543-69.
  • AKERLOF, G. y YELLEN, J. (1990). «The Fair-Wage Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 105, nº 2, pp. 255-284.
  • ARIELY, D., GNEEZY, U., LOEWENSTEIN G. y MAZAR, N. (2009). «Large Stakes and Big Mistakes». Review of Economic Studies, vol. 76, nº 2, pp. 451-469.
  • BANDIERA, O.; BARANKAY, I. y RASUL, I. (2010). «Social Incentives in the Workplace» Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77, pp. 417–458.
  • BARR, A. y SEMEELS, P. (2009). «Reciprocity in the Workplace», Experimental Economics, vol. 12, nº 1, pp. 99-112.
  • BEAURAINA, G. y MASCLET, D. (2016). «Does affirmative action reduce gender discrimination and enhance efficiency? New experimental evidence». European Economic Review, vol. 90, pp. 350-362.
  • BROWN, M.; FALK, A. y FEHR, E. (2004). «Relational contract and the nature of market interactions». Econometrica, vol. 72, nº3 , pp. 747-780.
  • BROWN, M., FALK, A. y E. FEHR, E. (2012). «Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device». Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 10, nº 4, pp. 887-907.
  • CADSBY, C.; BRAM, F.S. y TAPON, F. (2007). «Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay for Performance: An Experimental Investigation». Academy of Management Journal, vol. 50, nº 2, pp. 387-405.
  • CALSAMIGLIA, C.; FRANKE, J. y REY-BIEL, P. (2013): «The Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action in a Real-Effort Tournament». Journal of Public Economics, vol. 98, nº C, pp 15-31.
  • CHARNESS, G.; COBO-REYES, R.; JIMÉNEZ, N.; LACOMBA, J.A. y LAGOS, F. (2012) «The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game». American Economic Review, vol. 102, nº 5, pp. 2358-79.
  • CHARNESS, G.; COBO-REYES, R.: JIMÉNEZ, N.; LACOMBA, J.A. y LAGOS, F. (2013): «Job security and long-term investment: An experimental analysis». Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics Working Papers.
  • CHARNESS, G.; COBO-REYES, R.; LACOMBA, J.A.; LAGOS, F. y PÉREZ, J.M. (2016): «Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence». Experimental Economics, vol. 19, nº 2, pp. 433-459.
  • CHARNESS, G. y KUHN, P.J. (2007). «Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence». Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 25, nº 4, pp. 693-723.
  • CHARNESS, G. y KUHN, P.J. (2011): «Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?». Ashenfelter, O. y Card, D. (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
  • CHARNESS, G. y VILLEVAL, M.C. (2009). «Cooperation and Competition in Intergenerational Experiments in the Field and Laboratory». American Economic Review, vol. 99, nº 3, pp. 956-978.
  • CLARK, A.E.; MASCLET, D. y VILLEVAL, M.C. (2010). «Effort and comparison income: experimental and survey evidence». Industrial Relations & Labor, vol. 63, nº3, pp. 407-426.
  • COOPER, D.J.; KAGEL, J.H.; LO, W. y GU, Q.L. (1999). «Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers». American Economic Review, vol. 89, nº 4, pp. 781-804.
  • CORGNET B., HERNAN-GONZALEZ, R. y SCHNITER E. (2015). «Why real leisure really matters: incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory». Experimental Economics, vol. 18, nº 2, pp 284-301.
  • CORNS, A. y SCHOTTER, A. (1999). «Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions», American Economic Review, vol. 89, nº 1, pp. 291-305.
  • CROSON, R. y GNEEZY, U. (2009). «Gender difference in preferences». Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 47, nº 2, pp. 448-474.
  • DIAZ-SERRANO, L. (2005). «On the negative relationship between labor income uncertainty and homeownership: risk aversion vs. credit constraints». Journal of Housing Economics, vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 109-126.
  • DICKINSON, D.L. (1999). «An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities», Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 17, nº 4, pp. 638-670.
  • DOHMEN, T.J. y FALK, A. (2006). «Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender». Discussion Paper, nº 2001 (Institute for the Study of Labor).
  • FALK, A.; HUFFMAN, D. y MACLEOD, B. (2015). «Institutions and Contract Enforcement». Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 33, nº 3, pp. 571-590.
  • FALK, A. e ICHINO, A. (2006). «Clean Evidence on Peer Effects». Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 24, nº 1, pp. 39-57.
  • FALK, A. y KOSFELD, M. (2006). «The Hidden Costs of Control». American Economic Review, vol. 96, nº 5, pp. 1611-1630.
  • FARBER, H.S. (2005). «Is tomorrow another day? The labor supply of New York City cabdrivers». Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, nº 1, pp. 46-82.
  • FEHR, R. y GÄCHTER, S. (2002). «Fairness in the Labour Market» en Bolle, F. y Lehmann-Waffenschmid, M. (eds.) Surveys in Experimental Economics. Springer Verlag, Heidelberg.
  • FEHR, E.; KIRCHSTEIGER, G. y RIEDL, A. (1993). «Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, nº 2, pp. 437-460.
  • FREY, B. (1993). «Does monitoring increase work effort? The rivalry between trust and loyalty». Economic Inquiry, nº 31, pp. 663-670.
  • GÄCHTER, S. y THÖNI, C. (2010). «Social comparison and performance: experimental evidence on the fair-wage-effort hypothesis». Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 76, nº 3, pp. 531-543.
  • GNEEZY, U.; LEONARD, K.L. y LIST, J.A. (2009). «Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society». Econometrica, vol. 77, nº 5, pp. 1637-1664.
  • GNEEZY, U.; NIEDERLE, M. y RUSTICHINI, A. (2003). «Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 118, nº 3, pp. 1049-1074.
  • GNEEZY, U. y RUSTICHINI, A. (2000). «Pay Enough or Don’t Pay At All». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 115, nº 3, pp. 791-810.
  • GNEEZY, U. y RUSTICHINI, A. (2004). «Gender and Competition at a Young Age». American Economic Review, vol. 94, nº 2, pp. 377-381.
  • LAZEAR, E. P. (2000). «Performance Pay and Productivity». American Economic Review, vol. 90, nº 3, pp. 1346-1361.
  • HAURIN, D.R. (1991). «Income Variability, Homeownership, and Housing Demand». Journal of Housing Economics, vol.1, pp. 60-74.
  • HAURIN, D. y GILL, H.L. (1987). «Effects of income variability on the demand of owner-occupied housing». Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 136-150.
  • MINCER, J. (1962). «On-the-job training: Cost, returns and some implications». Journal of Political Economy, vol. 70, nº 5, pp. 50-79.
  • MORTENSEN, D. y PISSARIDIES., C. (1994). «Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment». Review of Economic Studies, vol. 61, nº 3, pp. 397-415.
  • NIEDERLE, M.L, SEGAL, C. y VESTERLUND, L. (2013). «How Costly is Diversity? Affirmative Action In Light of Gender Differences in Competitiveness». Management Science, informs, vol. 59, nº 1, pp. 1-16.
  • NIEDERLE, M. y VESTERLUND, L. (2007). «Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 122, nº 3, pp. 1067-1101.
  • PAGER, D.; WESTERN, B. y BONIKOWSKI, B.(2009). «Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment». American Sociological Review, vol. 74, pp. 777-99.
  • RIACH, P.A. y RICH, J. (2002): «Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place». The Economic Journal, vol.112, pp. F480–F518.
  • ROBST, J.; DEITZ, R. y MCGOLDRICK, K. (1999). «Income variability, uncertainty and housing tenure choice». Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 29, nº 2, pp. 219-229.
  • SCHNEDLER, W. y VADOVIC, R. (2007). «Legitimacy of Control». Discussion Paper, nº 3013 (Institute for the Study of Labor).
  • SCHOTTER, A. y WEIGELT, K. (1992). «Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results». Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, nº 2, pp. 511-539.
  • SCHWIEREN, C. (2003). «The gender wage gap – due to differences in efficiency wage effects or discrimination?». Meteor Research Memorandum 046.
  • SEMLER, R. (1989). «Managing without managers». Harvard Bussines Review, September.
  • SEMLER, R. (1993). Maverick: The success Story Behind the World’s most unusual workplace». In Warner Books, New York.
  • SHAPIRO, C. y STIGLITZ, J.E. (1984). «Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device». American Economic Review, vol. 74, pp. 433-444.
  • SILLAMAA, M.A. (1999a): «How Work Effort Responds to Wage Taxation: A Non-linear versus a Linear Tax Experiment». Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 39, nº 2, pp. 219-233.
  • SILLAMAA, M.A. (1999b). «How Work Effort Responds to Wage Taxation: An Experimental Test of a Zero Top Marginal Tax Rate». Journal of Public Economics, vol. 73, nº 1, pp. 125-134.
  • SWENSON, C.W. (1988). «Taxpayer behavior in response to taxation: An experimental analysis». Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 7, pp. 1-28.
  • WILLIAMSON, O. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet