Truth mattersnormativity in thought and knowledge

  1. Pinedo, Manuel de
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2004

Volumen: 19

Número: 50

Páginas: 137-154

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

If language and thougt are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and linguistic utterances to be assessible as true or false. Furthermore, the paper is committed to a form of quietism according to which the very same thing that can be (truly) thought or expressed is the case: "soft facts" as opposed to hard, free-standing facts, independent of any possible rational activity of grasping them.

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