Efectos políticos sobre la acumulación de infraestructura pública en las regiones españolas

  1. Agnani Gambocorta, Betty
  2. Aray Casanova, Henry Ali
Revista:
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

ISSN: 0210-1173

Año de publicación: 2012

Número: 202

Páginas: 57-76

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

Resumen

En este trabajo contrastamos estadísticamente los efectos que tienen sobre la tasa de crecimiento de la infraestructura pública regional las combinaciones de partidos gobernando simultáneamente en los Gobiernos central y regional. Utilizamos datos de panel para las Comunidades Autónomas españolas en el período 1988-2004 y encontramos evidencia de que ciertas combinaciones de partidos tienen efectos significativos sobre la tasa de crecimiento de la infraestructura pública regional. Partiendo de los Motivos de Conveniencia Política (Pork Barrel Politics) formulamos tres hipótesis relacionadas con la discriminación entre regiones, la sintonía ideológica y la compra de apoyo político. Nuestros resultados arrojan evidencia de discriminación en contra de las regiones gobernadas por partidos de la oposición independientemente de si el Gobierno español es dirigido por la izquierda o la derecha con o sin mayoría parlamentaria. Se evidencia sintonía ideológica cuando gobierna el partido de derecha a nivel estatal, ya que las regiones gobernadas por ellos resultan especialmente favorecidas. Mientras que no encontramos pruebas que apoyen la existencia de compra de apoyo político cuando el partido que dirige al Gobierno central está en minoría.

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