Soft facts: Thinking practices and the architecture of reality

  1. Bensusan, Hilan
  2. Pinedo, Manuel de
Revista:
Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 1130-0507

Año de publicación: 2014

Número: 61

Páginas: 7-21

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.6018/DAIMON/163921 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Otras publicaciones en: Daimon: revista internacional de filosofía

Resumen

Es común criticar la idea de objetividad afirmando que no puede haber contacto cognitivo alguno con el mundo que no esté constituido por los materiales mismos que constituyen el pensamiento, y concluir de ello que la idea debe abandonarse y que el mundo está �felizmente perdido�. Rechazamos esta conclusión y defendemos que la objetividad puede situarse dentro del dominio del pensamiento si concebimos los hechos, de manera similar a como lo hace McDowell, como pensables y sin embargo independientes de cualquier acto de pensar. Finalmente, defendemos que nuestra propuesta no involucra ningún compromiso empirista.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • ALLISON, H.E. (1983), Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, New Haven, Yale �niversity Press.
  • BENS�SAN, H. & M. DE PINEDO (2007), «Minimal Empiricism without Dogmas», Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 35, 197-206.
  • BRANDOM, R. (1994), Making it Explicit, Harvard, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press.
  • BRANDOM, R. (1999), «Varieties of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism» in R. Brandom, R. (ed.) Rorty and his Critics, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 156-182.
  • BRANDOM, R. (2002), «Non-inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell’s Empiricism», in Nicholas H. Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell, London, Routledge, pp. 92-105.
  • BRANDOM, R. (2002b), Tales of the Mighty Dead, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press.
  • CAMPBELL, K. (1990), Abstract Particulars, Oxford, Blackwell.
  • DAVIDSON, D. (1974), «On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme», in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 183-98.
  • DAVIDSON. D. (1986), «A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs», in Truth, Language, and History, Oxford, Oxford �niversity Press, 2005, pp. 89-107.
  • FICHTE, J.G. (1797), Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftlehre (Second Introduction to the Theory of Science), Augsburg, Philosophisches Journal, vol. VII, pp. 1-20.
  • FINE, K. (2005), «Tense and Reality», in Modality and Tense — Philosophical Papers, Oxford, Oxford �niversity Press, pp. 261-320.
  • HEGEL, G.W.F. (1802), Faith and Knowledge, New York, S�NY, 1977� trans. of Glauben und Wissen by H. S. Harris and W. Cerf.
  • HEGEL, G.W.F. (1807), Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, Oxford �niversity Press, 1977� trans. of Phänemonologie des Geistes by A.V. Miller.
  • HEGEL, G.W.F. (1825-6), Lectures on the History of Philosophy, London, Paul, Trench & Trübner, 1892-6� trans. of Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simpson.
  • HORNSBY, J. (1997), «Truth: The Identity Theory», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97, 1-24.
  • KANT, I. (1781/7), Critique of Pure Reason, London, Macmillan, 1929� trans. of Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga, Hartknoch) by N. Kemp Smith.
  • KANT, I. (1790), Critique of Judgement, Oxford, Oxford �niversity Press, 1973� trans. of Kritik der Urteilskraft (Berlin, Lagarde und Friederich) by J. C. Meredith.
  • KAPLAN, D. (1989), «Demonstratives», in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan, New York, Oxford �niversity Press, pp. 481-563.
  • KRIPKE, S. (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford, Blackwell.
  • LANGTON, R. (2001), Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves, Oxford,
  • Oxford �niversity Press. MCDOWELL, J. (1982), «Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge» in Meaning, Knowledge
  • and Reality, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press, 1998, pp. 369-94.
  • MCDOWELL, J. (1984), «Wittgenstein on Following Rule» in Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press, 1998, pp. 221-62.
  • MCDOWELL, J. (1994), Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press.
  • MCDOWELL, J. (1998), «Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality (a revised version of the Woodbridge Lectures� Columbia �niversity, April 15, 16 and 17, 1997)», Journal of Philosophy 95, 431-91.
  • MCDOWELL, J. (2000), «Scheme-content Dualism and Empiricism», in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. by L. E. Hahn, Illinois, Open Court.
  • MCDOWELL, J. (2007), «What Myth?», in The Engaged Intellect, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press, 2009, pp. 308-23.
  • MOLNAR, G. (2003), Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, Oxford, Oxford �niversity Press.
  • OCKHAM, W. (1983), Predestination, Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents (2nd ed. & trans. by M. M. Adams and N. Kretzmann), Indianapolis, Hackett.
  • PERRY, J. (1979), «The Problem of the Essential Indexical», Noûs, 13, 3-21.
  • PERRY, J. (1997), «Indexicals and Demonstratives» in R. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 586-612.
  • PHILONENKO, A. (1973), «Fichte», in Y. Belaval 1973, Histoire de la Philosophie 2. Enciclopédie de la Pléiade, vol. 36., Paris, Gallimard.
  • PINEDO, M. DE & H. BENS�SAN (2012), «Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on (Minimal) Empiricism and Experience», International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20, 741-47.
  • SELLARS, W. (1956), «Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind», reprinted as a book in Cambridge, Mass., Harvard �niversity Press, 1997.
  • STRAWSON, P. (1967), The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, London, Methuen.
  • WILLIAMS, M. (1996), Unnatural Doubts, Princeton, Princeton �niversity Press.
  • WILLIAMS, M. (1996a), «Exorcism and Enchantment», The Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 99-109.
  • WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell� trans. of Philosophische Untersuchungen by G. E. M. Anscombe, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees.
  • WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1956), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford, Blackwell� trans. of Bemerkungen zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp) by G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe.
  • WRIGHT, C. (2002), «Appendix to ‘Human Nature?’» in Nicholas H. Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell, London, Routledge, pp. 160-73.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet