Capitalismo kantiano y el modelo stakeholderla necesidad de una ética empresarial de la justicia

  1. Francés Gómez, Pedro
Revista:
Las Torres de Lucca: revista internacional de filosofía política

ISSN: 2255-3827

Año de publicación: 2012

Volumen: 1

Número: 0

Páginas: 43-74

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Las Torres de Lucca: revista internacional de filosofía política

Resumen

La "teoría de los stakeholders" se ha impuesto como modo de concebir las organizaciones, en particular las empresas con ánimo de lucro. Éstas se describen como redes de públicos o grupos interesados, ante los que los gestores tienen una responsabilidad multi-fiduciaria. El máximo proponente de la gestión de stakeholders en el ámbito empresarial, Edward Freeman, sostiene que una teoría normativa de la gestión de stakeholders establecería que las obligaciones fiduciarias de los gestores son auténticos deberes morales, debido al valor intrínseco de cada uno de los interesados en la organización. El presente artículo critica el fundamento empleado por Freeman para defender la teoría normativa de los stakeholders. El elemento fundamental de la crítica es que se trata del mismo fundamento normativo que emplea la teoría heredada de la firma; mientras que la teoría de Freeman resulta menos precisa que aquella. Como alternativa se propone concebir la organización como un ámbito de justicia, un contexto de interacción social donde las partes encontrarían racional acordar criterios de distribución del beneficio que asegurasen la cooperación necesaria para producirlos. Este mecanismo fundamenta las obligaciones sin recurrir a supuestos como la dignidad individual o los derechos individuales. Pero no impide operacionalizar las demandas de justicia en forma de derechos de diverso tipo.

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