Know Thyselfa tale of two theses and two theories

  1. Villanueva Fernández, Alberto Neftalí
Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2014

Volumen: 33

Número: 3

Páginas: 49-65

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Referencias bibliográficas

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  • BILGRAMI, A. (1992), Belief and Meaning; Oxford, Blackwell.
  • BAR-ON, D. (1992b), "Can Externalism be Reconciled with Self-Knowledge?", Philosophical Topics 20 (1), pp. 233-267.
  • BAR-ON, D. (1998), "Self-Knowledge and Resentment"; in: Wright et alii (eds.) (1998), 207-243.
  • BRUECKNER, A. (2003), "Two Transcendental Arguments Concerning Self- Knowledge"; in Nuccetelli (ed.) (2003), pp. 185-200.
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  • DAVIDSON, D. (1984), "First Person Authority", Dialectica 38, pp. 101-111.
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  • FRÁPOLLI, M., and VILLANUEVA, N. (2012), "Minimal Expressivism", Dialectica 66, 4, pp. 471-487.
  • HACKER, P. M. S. (1997), "Davidson on First-Person Authority", The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 188, pp. 285-304.
  • MEDINA, J. (2006), "What's so Special about Self-Knowledge", Philosophical Studies, 129, 3, pp. 575-603.
  • MORAN, R. (1997), "Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing." European Journal of Philosophy 5, pp. 141-163.
  • MORAN, R.. (2001), Authority and Estrangement, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • NUCCETELLI, S. (ed.) (2003), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self- Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
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  • WRIGHT, C. 1998. "Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy", in Wright et alii (eds.) (1998), pp. 101-122.
  • WRIGHT, C, SMITH, B., and MACDONALD, C. (eds) (1998), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet