La capacidad estatal en la gestión de los conflictos violentosel caso de Irak

  1. García Guindo, Miguel 1
  2. Mousa Fayadt, Adnan 2
  3. Montabes Pereira, Juan 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Jaén
    info

    Universidad de Jaén

    Jaén, España

    ROR https://ror.org/0122p5f64

  2. 2 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
RIPS: Revista de investigaciones políticas y sociológicas

ISSN: 1577-239X

Año de publicación: 2015

Volumen: 14

Número: 2

Páginas: 95-112

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.15304/RIPS.14.2.2754 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: RIPS: Revista de investigaciones políticas y sociológicas

Resumen

El presente artículo aborda la importancia de la capacidad del Estado y su habilidad para formular e implementar estrategias que le permitan alcanzar objetivos económicos y sociales en el ámbito de su propia sociedad. Para ello, se toma como referencia el estudio de caso de Irak, acotando el estudio a la horquilla temporal 2003-2007. El objetivo último de este trabajo es poner de manifiesto la importancia de la satisfacción de  las demandas sociales (particularmente en materia de seguridad) a fin de afrontar las tensiones sistémicas que generan determinados agravios y alimentan los incentivos que ofrece la violencia política a gran escala.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet