Operaciones fuera de presupuesto (off budget), factores políticos y deuda municipalUn estudio empírico aplicando una metodología de datos de panel

  1. Gemma Pérez-López
  2. Ana María Plata-Díaz
  3. José Luis Zafra-Gómez
  4. Antonio M. López-Hernández
Journal:
Gestión y política pública

ISSN: 2448-9182 1405-1079

Year of publication: 2014

Volume: 23

Issue: 1

Pages: 185-218

Type: Article

More publications in: Gestión y política pública

Abstract

Attempts to overcome borrowing restrictions imposed on local authorities have led public managers to create instrumental entities by means of which certain levels of debt are not included in the municipal budget. The aim of the present study is to determine whether the creation of agencies, public enterprises or consortia, or the outsourcing of high-cost public services, together with relevant political and financial aspects, are relevant to local authority borrowing requirements. In this study, various databases are employed to construct a panel of 1 517 municipalities for the period 2003-2008 to determine which of these factors are most influential on municipal debt in Spain. The results obtained from the application of fixed-effects panel data methodology show that financial variables and population size influence municipal borrowing, and these authorities presenting a greater number of outsourcing operations and of consortia tend to have lower levels of debt.

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