Instituciones y subdesarrolloa vueltas con la divergencia

  1. López Castellano, Fernando 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought

ISSN: 2386-5768

Año de publicación: 2016

Volumen: 3

Número: 2

Páginas: 106-125

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.5209/IJHE.54620 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought

Resumen

Este artículo ofrece una exposición panorámica y actualizada de las principales aportaciones de la literatura neoinstitucionalista del crecimiento a la explicación del “milagro europeo” y a la “divergencia” de Europa Occidental con respecto a otras regiones. También recoge las argumentaciones de la nueva historiografía, que cuestionan el supuesto del desempeño excepcional de las economías europeas en los siglos previos a la Revolución Industrial, e insisten en el carácter abrupto y tardío de la divergencia. Para enriquecer el debate sobre el desigual crecimiento económico a lo largo del tiempo y la divergencia, el artículo añade lo más representativo del Análisis Institucional Histórico y Comparativo sobre la “larga” divergencia entre Europa Occidental y Oriente Medio. El artículo concluye con una breve reflexión sobre la virtualidad de este debate para explicar las causas del desarrollo y el subdesarrollo.

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