Ciclos políticos y factores explicativos de la externalización de servicios públicos en los gobiernos locales

Referencias bibliográficas

• AIDT, T.S., VEIGA, F. J., y VEIGA, L.G. (2011): “Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model. Public choice, 148(1-2), 21-44.
• ANSELL, C., BOIN, A. y Keller, A. (2010): “Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18 (4), 195–207.
• ASHWORTH, J, GEYS, B y HEYNDELS, B. (2005): “Government weakness and local public debt development in Flemish municipalities.” International Tax and Public Finance, 12(4), 395–422.
• BALAGUER-COLL, M.T. y BRUN-MARTOS, M.I. (2013): “El efecto del gasto público sobre las posibilidades de reelección de los gobiernos locales.” Revista de Contabilidad, 16(1), 74-80.
• BASTIDA, F., BEYAERT, A. y BENITO, B. (2013): “Electoral cycles and local government debt management.” Local Government Studies, 39(1), 107-132.
• BAWN, K. y ROSENBLUTH, F. (2006): “Short versus long coalitions: electoral accountability and the size of the public sector.” American Journal of Political Science, 50(2), 251-265.
• BEL G. y FAGEDA, X. (2007): “Why do local governments privatise public services? A survey of empirical studies.” Local Government Studies, 33(4), 517–534.
• BEL, G. y FAGEDA, X. (2008): “Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste.” Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 11(1), 45-65.
• BEL, G y FAGEDA, X. (2009): “Factors explaining local privatization: a meta-regression analysis.” Public Choice, 139(1-2), 105-119.
• BEL, G. FAGEDA, X. y WARNER, M.E. (2010): “Is private production of public services cheaper than public production? A meta‐regression analysis of solid waste and water services.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(3), 553-577.
• BENITO, B. y BASTIDA, F. (2008): “Política y gestión financiera municipal.” Revista de Contabilidad, 11(2), 43.
• BASKARAN, T. MIN, B. y UPPAL, Y. (2015): “Election cycles and electricity provision: Evidence from a quasiexperiment with Indian special elections.” Journal of Public Economics, 126, 64-73.
• BASTIDA, F. BENITO, B. y GUILLAMÓN, M.D. (2009): “An empirical assessment of the municipal financial situation in Spain.” International Public Management Journal, 12(4), 484-499.
• BENITO, B. BASTIDA, F. y VICENTE, C. (2013): “Municipal elections and cultural expenditure.” Journal of Cultural Economics, 37(1), 3-32.
• BINET*, M.E. y PENTECOTE, J.S. (2004): “Tax degression and the political budget cycle in French municipalities.” Applied Economics Letters, 11(14), 905-908.
• BLAIS, A. y NADEAU, R. (1992): “The electoral budget cycle.” Public choice, 74(4), 389-403.
• BOYNE, G. (1998): “Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality: Public Choice and Service Contracting in U.S. Local Government.” Public Administration Review 58 (6), 474–484. doi:10.2307/977575.
• BRENDER, A. (2003): “The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989– 1998.” Journal of Public Economics, 87(9), 2187-2205.
• BROWN, T.L., POTOSKI, M. y VAN SLYKE, D.M. (2008): “Changing modes of service delivery: How past choices structure future choices.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(1), 127-143.
• BROWN, T.L. POTOSKI, M. y VAN SLYKE, D.M. (2008): “Changing modes of service delivery: How past choices structure future choices.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(1), 127-143.
• BRUDNEY, J.L. FERNÁNDEZ, S., RYU, J.E. y WRIGHT, D.S.. (2005): “Exploring and Explaining Contracting Out: Patters among the American States.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15 (3), 393–419. doi:10.1093/jopart/mui019.
• CASTRO, V. y MARTINS, R. (2014):Political cycles and government expenditures: Evidence from portugal. MIMEO.
• CHRISTOFFERSEN, H. y BO LARSEN, K. (2007): “Economies of scale in Danish municipalities: expenditure effects versus quality effects.” Local Government Studies, 33(1), 77–95.
• DIJKGRAAF, E. y GRADUS, R.H. (2003).“Cost savings of contracting out refuse collection.” Empírica, 30(2), 149-161.
• DRAZEN, A. y ESLAVA, M. (2010): “Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence.” Journal of development economics, 92(1), 39-52.
• DUBIN, J. y NAVARRO, P. (1988): “How markets for impure public goods organize: The case of household refuse collection.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4(2), 217–241.
• ESCUDERO-FERNÁNDEZ, P. y PRIOR, D. (2002). “Endeudamiento y ciclos políticos presupuestarios”
• FERGUSON, N.K. (1984). The feminist case against bureaucracy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
• FERNANDEZ, S., RYU, J.E. y BRUDNEY, J.L.. (2008): “Exploring variations in contracting for services among American local governments: do politics still matter?.” The American Review of Public Administration, 38 (4), 439-462.
• FOUCAULT, M. MADIES, T. y PATY, S. (2008): “Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities.” Public Choice, 137(1-2), 57-80.
• FOREMMY, D. y RIEDEL, N. (2014): “Business taxes and the electoral cycle.” Journal of Public Economics, 115, 48-61.
• FOX, R.L. y SCHUHMANN, R.A. (1999): “Gender and local government: A comparison of women and men city managers.” Public Administration Review, 231-242.
• FREY, B.S. y SCHNEIDER, F. (1978a): “A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom.” The Economic Journal, 88(350), 243-253.
• FREY, B.S. y SCHNEIDER, F. (1978b): “An empirical study of politico-economic interaction in the United States.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 174-183.
• FREY, B.S. y SCHNEIDER, F. (1979): “An econometric model with an endogenous government sector.” Public choice, 34(1), 29-43.
• FUENTELSAZ, L., GÓMEZ, J., y POLO, Y. (2004): “Aplicaciones del análisis de supervivencia a la investigación en economía de la empresa.” Cuadernos de Economía y Dirección de la Empresa, 19, 81-114.
• FUNKHOUSER, M. (2012): “Outsourcing and the Critical Need for Access to Capital.” Public Administration Review 72 (6), 900–901.
• GALLI, E. y ROSSI, S.P. (2002): “Political budget cycles: the case of the Western German Länder.” Public Choice, 110(3-4), 283-303.
• GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ, I.M. MORDÁN, N. y CUADRADO-BALLESTEROS, B. (2014): “Do electoral cycles affect local financial health?” Policy Studies, 35(6), 533-556.
• GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ, I.M., PRADO-LORENZO, J.M. y CUADRADO-BALLESTEROS, B. (2011): “Do progressive goverments undertake different debt burdens? partisan vs. electoral cycles.” Revista de Contabilidad, 14(1), 29-57.
• GARRONE, P. y MARZANO, R. (2015): “Why do local governments resist contracting out?” Urban Affairs Review, 51(5), 616-648.
• GUILLAMÓN, M.D., BASTIDA, F. y BENITO, B. (2013): “The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure.” European Journal of Law and Economics, 36(3), 447-469.
• GONZÁLEZ-GÓMEZ, F. y GUARDIOLA, J. (2009): “A Duration Model for the Estimation of the Contracting Out of Urban Water Management in Southern Spain.” Urban Affairs Review 44 (6), 886–906. doi: 10.1177/1078087408329274.
• HAGEN, T.P. y VABO, S.I. (2005): “Political characteristics, institutional procedures and fiscal performance: Panel data analyses of Norwegian local governments.” 1991–1998. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), 43-64.
• HODGE, G. (2000): Privatization: An international review of performance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• JAMES, E.H. y WOOTEN, L.P. (2010): Leading Under Pressure: From Surviving to Thriving Before, During, and After a Crisis. New York: Routledge Press.
• JENKINS, S.F. (2005): Survival Analysis. Available at: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/teaching/stephenj/ec968/ pdfs/ec968lnotesv6.pdf. Colchester, UK: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex.
• KATSIMI, M. y SARANTIDES, V. (2012): “Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?.” Public Choice, 151(1-2), 325-362.
• KIM, C. (2015): “The Effects of Recessions on Contracting Moderated by Institutional Arrangements of Government: Evidence From California Cities, 1993–2009.” Public Budgeting and Finance, 35(2), 40-65.
• KLOMP, J. y DE HAAN, J. (2013): “Political budget cycles and election outcomes.” Public Choice, 157(1-2), 245-267.
• LEVINE, C.H. (1978): “Organizational decline and cutback management.” Public Administration Review, 38(4), 316–325.
• LAGO-PEÑAS, I., y LAGO-PEÑAS, S. (2008): “Explaining budgetary indiscipline: evidence from Spanish municipalities.” Public Finance and Management, 8(1).
• LAGO-PEÑAS, I. y LAGO-PEÑAS, S. (2009): “Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending?” Economics of Governance, 10(1), 85-98.
• LÓPEZ-HERNÁNDEZ, A. M., ZAFRA-GÓMEZ, J. L., PLATA-DÍAZ, A. M., y DE LA HIGUERA-MOLINA, E. J. (2017). Modeling fiscal stress and contracting out in local government: The influence of time, financial condition, and the great recession. The American Review of Public Administration. 48 (6).
• MÁÑEZ, J.A., ROCHINA, M.E. y SANCHIS, J.A. (2008): Using Survival Models with Individual Data. In Measuring Entrepreneurship: Building a Statistical System, edited by E. Congregado, 227–246. New York: Springer.
• MAÑEZ, J. A., MONER-COLONQUES, R., SEMPERE-MONERRIS, J.J. y URBANO, A. (2016): “Brand price differentials in retail distribution: product quality and service quality.” Applied Economics, 1-12.
• NORDHAUS, W.D. (1975): “The political business cycle.” The review of economic studies, 42(2), 169-190.
• PLATA-DÍAZ, A. M., DE LA HIGUERA-MOLINA, E. J., GARRIDO-RODRÍGUEZ, J. C., y ZAFRA-GÓMEZ, J. L. (2017). Contracting Out and Social Services: Responses to the Austerity Machine, Financial Condition and Political Parties. Administration & Society, 0095399717713797.
• PRENTICE R. L. y GLOECKLER, L.A. (1978): “Regression Analysis of Grouped Survival Data with Application to the Breast Cancer Data.” Biometrics 34 (1), 57–67.
• REID, B.G. (1998): “Endogenous elections, electoral budget cycles and Canadian provincial governments.” Public Choice, 97(1-2), 35-48.
• SHI, M., y SVENSSON, J. (2006): “Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?.” Journal of public economics, 90(8), 1367-1389.
• STIVERS, C. (1995): “Settlement Women and Bureau Men: Constructing a Usable Past for Public Administration.” Public Administration Review. 55(6), 522-529.
• TELLIER, G. (2006): “Public expenditures in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-economic interactions.” Public Choice, 126(3-4), 367-385.
• VEIGA, L.G. y VEIGA, F.J. (2007): “Political business cycles at the municipal level.” Public choice, 131(1-2), 45-64.
• VERGNE, C. (2009): “Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries.” European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77.
• WARD, H. y JOHN, P. (1999): “Targeting benefits for electoral gain: Constituency marginality and the distribution of grants to English local authorities.” Political Studies, 47(1), 32-52.
• ZAFRA-GÓMEZ, J.L., LÓPEZ-HERNÁNDEZ, A.M., PLATA-DÍAZ, A.M. y GARRIDO-RODRÍGUEZ, J.C. (2016). Financial and Political Factors Motivating the Privatisation of Municipal Water Services. Local Government Studies. 42(2), 287-308.
• ZAFRA-GÓMEZ, J.L., PEDAUGA L.E., PLATA-DÍAZ, A.M. y LÓPEZ-HERNÁNDEZ, A.M. (2014). Do local authorities use NPM delivery forms to overcome problems of fiscal stress? Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting/Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 43(1), 21-46.
• ZAFRA-GÓMEZ, J.L. y PÉREZ-MUÑIZ, M.A. (2010). Overcoming Cost-Inefficiences within Small Municipalities: Improve Financial Condition or Reducethe Quality of Public Services?. Environment and Planning, 28(4), 609-629.
• ZAFRA-GÓMEZ, JL. PRIOR, D., PLATA-DÍAZ, A.M. y LÓPEZ-HERNÁNDEZ, A.M. (2013). Reducing Costs in Times of Crisis: Delivery Forms in Small and Medium Sized Local Governments’ Waste Management Services. Public Administration, 91(1): 51–68.