Does impartial reasoning matter in economic decisions? An experimental result about distributive (un)fairness in a production context.

  1. Marcon, Laura 1
  2. Francés-Gómez, Pedro 1
  3. Faillo, Marco 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

  2. 2 University of Trento
    info

    University of Trento

    Trento, Italia

    ROR https://ror.org/05trd4x28

Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2020

Volumen: 35

Número: 2

Páginas: 217-233

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.21011 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

El velo de ignorancia rawlsiano debería inducir una conducta justa en contextos distributivos. Este estudio intentó, mediante un juego del Dictador con opciones de dar y tomar, re-crear una especie de posición original en la que el razonamiento tras el velo debería haber sido una señal moral para sujetos que debían distribuir una ganancia común conseguida con medios de producción desiguales. Sin embargo, el diseño experimental resultó recordar más al estado de naturaleza hobbesiano que a la posición original de Rawls, y demostró que el recurso heurístico a la idea de una decisión tras el velo de ignorancia es ineficaz en un contexto de producción y distribución.

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Información de financiación

Funding for the research reported in this paper was provided by the Spanish Ministry of Economy through Research Grants FFI2011-29005 and FFI2014-56391P.

Financiadores

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