Sorpresas estratégicas e Inteligencia de alerta temprana

  1. Javier Jordán
Revista:
Global strategy reports

ISSN: 2695-8937

Año de publicación: 2020

Número: 56

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Global strategy reports

Resumen

Este documento analiza las causas de las sorpresas estratégicas en materia de Defensa agrupadas en cuatro conjuntos de factores: limitaciones metodológicas, sesgos cognitivos, patologías en las organizaciones responsables de generar inteligencia de alerta temprana, y escasa receptividad política que conduce a un déficit de respuesta.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet