Show MeTractarian non-representationalism

  1. José Andrés Forero-Mora 1
  2. María José Frápolli 2
  1. 1 Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios
    info

    Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios

    Bogotá, Colombia

    ROR https://ror.org/01r0dam38

  2. 2 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

ISSN: 0210-1602

Año de publicación: 2021

Título del ejemplar: The significance of the Tractatus

Volumen: 40

Número: 2

Páginas: 63-81

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía

Resumen

En este trabajo defendemos tres tesis entrelazadas. La primera es que la deuda de la semántica tractariana con la de Frege es más profunda de lo que comúnmente se supone. La identificación de una metasemántica inferencialista para, al menos, las oraciones no elementales en el Tractatus de Wittgenstein es la segunda. Y de ella se desprende la tercera: que el significado de las expresiones de nivel superior, las constantes lógicas entre ellas, es expresivo. También reconocemos la dificultad de dar una visión semántica coherente de la primera obra de Wittgenstein y, en consecuencia, una visión comprensible del papel de la lógica que se dibuja en ella

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