Y sonaron las trompetas a las puertas de Jericó... en forma de sentencia del Bundesverfassungsgericht

  1. Pablo Martín Rodríguez
Revista:
Revista General de Derecho Europeo

ISSN: 1696-9634

Año de publicación: 2020

Número: 52

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Revista General de Derecho Europeo

Resumen

El 5 de mayo de 2020, la Sala Segunda del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán dictó una sentencia en la que declara ultra vires tanto las correspondientes Decisiones del Banco Central Europeo que establecen el Programa de adquisición de títulos de deuda públicos como la Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia en el asunto Weiss y otros que había confirmado su validez. El presente estudio analiza críticamente este severo pronunciamiento del Tribunal de Karlsruhe ilustrando sus contradicciones y tratando de identificar sus posibles consecuencias.

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