Wittgenstein vs. Chomskyrecortando distancias

  1. Juan José Acero 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada, Spain
Revista:
Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin

ISSN: 2254-0601

Año de publicación: 2019

Título del ejemplar: Linguistic and Rational Pragmatism: The Philosophies of Wittgenstein and Brandom

Volumen: 8

Número: 9

Páginas: 18

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.5281/ZENODO.3242071 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin

Resumen

In this work the widely endorsed claim that the conceptions of language that the late Wittgenstein and Chomsky respectively shaped conflict with each other is rejected. On such a viewpoint, while Wittgenstein would have viewed language as a repertoire of actions articulated by social relationships, Chomsky understands language as a faculty of human’s biological nature, just like the visual system. In the first six sections of the paper the main criteria resorted to support such an alleged incompatibility are deactivated: either they are coarse enough to make it impossible to render philosophical useful conclusions or they ignore central elements of both Wittgenstein’s and Chomsky’s philosophies of language. In particular, the confusion that undermines this debate is cleared up by lending attention to the kind of language rules that they respectively focus on. In the remaining sections an argument is built up that goes deeper in the latter criticism’s implications. The argument zooms in on the assumption that language is a completely homogenous whole. Once this assumption is brought to light, the alleged incompatibility loosens its grip and nothing stands in the way of concluding that Wittgenstein’s and Chomsky’s conceptions of language are far from being fully opposite.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet