Chomsky y la nueva teoría de la referencia

  1. Acero, Juan José 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Journal:
Endoxa: Series Filosóficas

ISSN: 1133-5351

Year of publication: 2020

Issue Title: Ensayos en honor de Eloy Rada García

Issue: 46

Pages: 81-121

Type: Article

DOI: 10.5944/ENDOXA.46.2020.28586 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Endoxa: Series Filosóficas

Abstract

This essay presents Chomsky’s views on the New Theory of Reference. As against that theory, particularly against well-known ideas of Kripke’s and Putnam’s, Chomsky adduces a varied range of arguments whose main conclusions are the following: (i) that there no logically pure names in natural languages; (ii) that there is no non-artificial relation of reference which links words and things; (iii) that the so-called theory of reference deploys concepts which are alien to the methodological requirements built into natural science; and (iv) that meaning «is in the head». Aiming at bringing out the assumptions that support (i) – (iv), the essays hold that Chomsky’s rejection of the New Theory of Reference is shaped by his methodological naturalism, his pragmatic attitude towards ontology, his conceptual perspectivism, and his rationalism.

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