Estragos del fisicismo y del dualismo implícito en la filosofía analíticacaso Davidson y una alternativa
ISSN: 1132-8177
Año de publicación: 2002
Número: 10
Páginas: 27-68
Tipo: Artículo
Otras publicaciones en: Laguna: Revista de Filosofía
Resumen
In this paper I will examine how physicalism and dualism (usually implicit) pose some difficulties to Davidson’s anomalous monism with regard to both causal efficacy of mental properties and the very possibility of a scientific theory of mind. Such problems, which cannot be solved with the concept of «supervenience» maintained by Davidson, do not seem to have solution inside a physicalistic framework. However, they do not appear in a systemic approach because, on the one hand, the concept of «emergency» replaces the concept of «supervenience» removing its ontological ambiguety; and, on the other hand, reduction is not regarded in that approach as a necessary condition for a scientific psychology.