Algunas claves del futuro del sistema bancario

Referencias bibliográficas

• ACHARYA, V.; I. GUJRAL, y H. SHIN (2009), Bank Dividends in the Crisis: A Failure of Governance, VOX-EU.
• ADRIAN, T.; E. ETULA, y H. SHIN (2010), Risk Appetite and Exchange Rates, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report.
• ADRIAN, T., y SHIN, H. S. (2010), «Liquidity and leverage», Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19: 418-437.
• AGARWAL, S., y R. HAUSWALD (2011), «Authority and information», American Finance Association, Denver Meetings Paper.
• AL-DARWISH; A. HAFEMAN; M. IMPAVIDO; G. KEMP, y P. O’MALLEY (2011), «Possible unintended consequences of Basel III and Solvency II», Fondo Monetario International, WP 11/187.
• ARCE, O.; S. MAYORDOMO, y J. I. PEÑA (2011), «do sovereign CDS and bond markets share the same information to price credit risk? An empirical application to the European Monetary Union case», mimeo, Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores.
• AWREY, D. (2011), «Complexity, innovation and the regulation of modern financial markets», Oxford Legal Studies Research Papers, número 49/2011.
• BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2010), Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance.
• BECHT, M.; MAYER, C., y WAGNER, H. F. (2008), «Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry», Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(3): 241-256.
• BECK, T.; A. DEMIRGÜC-KUNT, y M. MARTÍNEZ PERNÍA (2007), «Reaching out: Access to and use of banking services across countries, Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 234-266.
• BECKER, B., y T. MILBOURN (2012), «How did increased competition affect credit ratings?», Journal of Financial Economics, en prensa.
• BENMELECH, E., y J. DLUGOSZ (2009), «The alchemy of CDO credit ratings», Journal of Monetary Economics, 56: 617-634.
• BERGER, A. N., y L. N. BLACK (2011), «Bank size, lending technologies, and small business finance», Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(3): 724-735.
• BERGSTRESSER, D., y T. PHILIPPON (2006), «CEO incentives and earnings management», Journal of Financial Economics, 80: 511-529.
• BERNILE, G., y G. JARRELL (2009), «The impact of the options backdating scandal on shareholders», Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47: 2–26.
• BLUNDELL-WIGNALL, A., y P. SLOVIK (2011), «A market perspective on the European sovereign debt and banking crisis», OECD Financial Market Trends.
• BOLTON, P.; X. FREIXAS, y J. SHAPIRO (2012), «The credit ratings game», Journal of Finance, en prensa.
• BREWER; E., y J. JAGTIANI (2009), «How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systemically important?», Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
• BORGY, V.; T. LAUBACH; J. B. MESONNIER, y J. P. RENNE (2011), «Fiscal policy, default risk and Euro Area sovereign bond spreads», mimeo. Banque de France.
• BROCKMAN, P.; X. MARTÍN, y E. UNLU (2012), «Executive compensation and the maturity structure of corporate debt», Journal of Finance, en prensa.
• BRUNNERMEIER, M.; A. CROCKETT; C. GOODHART; A. PERSAUD, y H. S. SHIN (2009), «Fundamental principles of financial regulation», 11th Geneva Report on the World Economy.
• BRUNNERMEIER, M. K., y Y. SANNIKOV (2010), «A macroeconomic model with a financial sector», mimeo.
• BURNSA, N., y KEDIAB, S. (2006), «The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting», Journal of Financial Econmics, 79(1): 35-67.
• BURNSA, N., y KEDIAB, S. (2008), «Executive option exercises and financial misreporting», Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(5): 845-857.
• BUTT, S.; SHIVDASANI, A.; STENDEVAD, C., y WYMAN, A. (2008), «Sovereign wealth funds: A growing global force in corporate finance», Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 20(1): 73-83.
• CALEM, P. S., y M. LACOUR-LITTLE (2003), «Risk-based capital requirements for mortgage loans», Journal of Banking and Finance, 28: 647-672.
• CAMPBELL, J. Y. (2006), «Household finance«, Journal of Finance, 61: 1553-1604.
• CARBÓ, S.; H. DEGRYSE, y F. RODRÍGUEZ (2011), «Lending relationships and credit rationing: the impact of securitization», mimeo, Funcas.
• CARBÓ, S.; E. KANE, y F. RODRÍGUEZ (2011), «Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to- fail-and-unwind banks in the US and the EU before and during the great recession», NBER Working Paper 16787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, EE.UU.
• CARBÓ, S.; D. MARQUÉS IBÁÑEZ, y F. RODRÍGUEZ (2011), «Securitization, risk transferring and financial stability: the case of Spain», Journal of International Money and Finance, doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011. 11004.
• CARBÓ, S.; F. RODRÍGUEZ, y G. UDELL (2009), «Bank market power and SME financing constraints», Review of Finance, 13: 309-340.
• CARBÓ, S.; KANE, E. J., y RODRÍGUEZ, F. (2008): «Evidence on differences in the effectiveness in safety net management in European Union Countries», Journal of Financial Services Research, 34: 151-176.
• CHEN, C.; T. STEINER, y A. WHITE (2006), «Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry», Journal of Banking and Finance, 30: 915-945.
• CHENG, Q., y WARFIELD, T. (2005), «Equity incentives and earnings management», The Accounting Review, 80(2): 441-476.
• COLES, J.; N. DANIEL, y L. NAVEEN (2006), «Managerial incentives and risktaking », Journal of Financial Economics, 79: 431-468.
• COMISIÓN EUROPEA (2011), Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, COM(2011)452, julio.
• COOPER, N., y C. SCHOLTES (2011), «Government bond market valuations in an era of dwindling supply», Bank for International Settlement Papers, 5.
• DE YOUNG, R.; SCOTT FRAME, W.; GLENNON, D., y NIGRO, P. (2010): «The information revolution and small business lending: the missing evidence», Working Paper 2010-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
• DUFFIE, D. (2008), «Innovations in credit risk transfer: Implications for financial stability», Bank for International Settlements Working paper, 255.
• DANIELSON, J.; H. S. SHIN, y J. P. ZIGRAND (2011), «Balance sheet capacity and endogenous risk», mimeo, London School of Economics.
• EUROPEAN UNION SCOREBOARD (2009), Study on the Enforcement of State Aid Rules at National Level, Comisión Europea.
• FAHRI, E., y TIROLE, J. (2009), «Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts», Working Paper, 318: 1-49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
• FONDO MONETARIO INTERNACIONAL (2010), «Chapter 1: Economic uncertainty, sovereign risk, and financial fragilities», Global Financial Stability Report: 1-55.
• GREENSPAN, A. (2005), «Risk transfer and financial stability». Remarks to the Federal Bank of Chicago’s, Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
• GREENSPAN, A. (2005a), «Future of the social security program and economics of retirement, Testimony before the Special Committee on Aging», US Senate, 15 de marzo.
• HACKETHAL, A.; M. HALIASSOS, y T. JAPPELI (2012), «Financial advisors. A case of babysitters?», Journal of Banking and Finance, 36 (2): 509-524.
• HERON, R., y E. LIE (2007), «Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants», Journal of Financial Economics, 83: 271-295.
• INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING (2011), Final Report, septiembre, HM Treasury, Reino Unido.
• INDERST, R., y M. OTTAVIANI (2009), «Misselling through agents», American Economic Review, 99: 883-908.
• KANE, E. J. (2010), «Redefining and controlling systemic risk», Atlantic Economic Journal, 38.
• KARLAN, D., y M. VALDIVIA (2012), «Teaching entrepreneurship: Impact of business training on microfinance clients and institutions», Review of Economics and Statistics, en prensa.
• KOTLIKOFF, L. (2006), «Is the United States bankrupt?», Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, julio-agosto: 235-249.
• LIE, E. (2005), «On the timing of CEO stock option awards», Management Science, 51: 802-812.
• LUSARDI, A., y O. S. MITCHELL (2007), «Baby boomer retirement security: the roles of planning, financial literacy, and housing wealth», Journal of Monetary Economics, 54: 205-224.
• MORCK, R.; A. SHLEIFER, y R. VISHNY (1988), «Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis», Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315.
• MORRIS, S., y H. S. SHIN (2004), «Liquidity black holes», Review of Finance, 8: 1-18.
• MORRIS, S., y H. S. SHIN (2008), «Financial regulation in a system context», Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 229-274.
• MURPHY, K. (1999), «Executive compensation», en Ashenfelter, O. y D. (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, 3b. North-Holland.
• NARAYANAN, M.; C. SCHIPANI, y H. SEYHUN (2007), «The economic impact of backdating of executive stock options», Michigan Law Review, 105: 1597-1641.
• NARAYANAN, M., y H. SEYHUN (2008), «Dating games: Do managers designate grant dates to increase their compensation», Review of Financial Studies, 21: 1907-1945.
• PENAS, M., y H. UNAL (2004), «Gains in bank mergers: Evidence from the bond market», Journal of Financial Economics, 74 (1): 149-179.
• PENG, L., y A. ROELL (2008), «Executive pay, earnings manipulation and shareholder lawsuits», Review of Finance, 12: 141-184.
• PURI, M.; J. ROCHOLL, y S. STEFFEN (2012), «Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between demand and supply effects», Journal of Financial Economics, en prensa.
• ROMO, L., y A. VAN RIXTEL (2011), «Non-enhanced debt financing by Euro Area under severe financial stress», mimeo, Banco de España.
• SEC (2011), «Impact assessment», Commission Staff Working Paper, 952.
• STANDARD AND POOR‘S (2011), Why Basel III and Solvency II Will Hurt Corporate Borrowing In Europe More Than In the U.S., septiembre.
• STULZ, R. (1988), «Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control», Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 25-54.
• VIVES, X. (2011), «El paradigma de la competencia en el sector bancario después de la crisis», Occasional Paper OP-196, IESE Business School, octubre.
• VÖLZ, M., y M. WEDOW (2009), «Does banks’ size distort market prices? Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market», Bundesbank Discussion Paper, Series 2, 06/2009.