Truth in pragmatism. Dewey and Brandom face to face

  1. María José Frápolli 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

ISSN: 2386-8066

Año de publicación: 2022

Título del ejemplar: Número monográfico. La investigación: normas y prácticas (La Lógica de John Dewey a discusión)

Volumen: 9

Número: 2

Páginas: 305-323

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.26754/OJS_ARIF/ARIF.202227304 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

Resumen

In this paper, I compare the approach to truth characteristic of pragmatism, often identified with warranted assertability, with the prosentential proposal put forward by Robert Brandom. I argue that Brandom’s is a genuine step forward from pragmatism and analytic philosophy, even though his philosophical take includes classical pragmatist features. Furthermore, I show that Dewey and Brandom coincide in their social kind of naturalism, also supported by evolutionary psychology. I conclude that the essential distinction between truth and warranted assertability cannot be exposed without involving an external perspective, the third-person perspective, which is absent in standard pragmatist approaches to truth.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet