Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional

  1. Pablo Amorós 1
  2. Ricardo Martínez 1
  3. Bernardo Moreno 1
  4. M. Socorro Puy 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Málaga
    info

    Universidad de Málaga

    Málaga, España

    ROR https://ror.org/036b2ww28

Revista:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Año de publicación: 2012

Título del ejemplar: Salvador Barberà

Volumen: 3

Número: 1-2

Páginas: 1-14

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-011-0039-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Resumen

A high court has to decide whether a law is constitutional, unconstitutional or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be single-peaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.

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Información de financiación

We thank Luis Corchón and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Financial assistance from Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project ECO2008-03674/ECON is gratefully acknowledged.

Financiadores

    • ECO2008-03674/ECON
Fuente de los datos: Dialnet