Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

  1. Carmen Herrero 1
  2. Ricardo Martínez 2
  1. 1 Universitat d'Alacant
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    Universitat d'Alacant

    Alicante, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05t8bcz72

    Geographic location of the organization Universitat d'Alacant
  2. 2 Brown University
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    Brown University

    Providence, Estados Unidos

    ROR https://ror.org/05gq02987

    Geographic location of the organization Brown University
Journal:
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ISSN: 1863-8279,  1134-5764

Year of publication: 2008

Volume: 16

Issue: 2

Pages: 272-283

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1007/S11750-008-0043-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

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Abstract

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems and axiomatically characterize them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal distance rule.

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