El salario a rendimiento en el sector de la construcción. Modelo para determinar el precio óptimo y el precio máximo a pagar por un trabajo a destajo

  1. Ribera Roget, Albert
Dirigida por:
  1. Joquim de Ciurana Gay Director/a

Universidad de defensa: Universitat de Girona

Fecha de defensa: 20 de marzo de 2013

Tribunal:
  1. Josep Castellano Costa Presidente/a
  2. Nelia Valverde Gascueña Secretario/a
  3. María Paz Sáez Pérez Vocal

Tipo: Tesis

Teseo: 364728 DIALNET lock_openTDX editor

Resumen

This doctoral thesis explores HR management through systems of production incentives in the construction sector which has been instrumental to the Spanish economy. The transformation of a time-based payment system to a performance or production-based payment system is difficult if you consider the complexity of the calculation and the environment in which prices are negotiated. In any case, before agreeing to a piece-rate determined price it is imperative that the person responsible for negotiating on behalf of the company knows the relationship of this piece rate compared to expected labour costs as an objective in the opening plans. The main objective of this thesis is to propose an algorithm in flowchart form that facilitates —from the data found in the costs study— knowledge about the price range within which the economic incentive for piece-rate compensation for any work should be established by applying a few simple conversion coefficients proposed by the model itself