Two Kinds of Second Person Authority

  1. Edson Bernd
  2. Antonio Gaitán-Torres
  3. Manuel de Pinedo-García
Libro:
VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012
  1. Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
  2. José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
  3. José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
  4. Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
  5. Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)

Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1

Año de publicación: 2012

Páginas: 132-138

Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)

Tipo: Aportación congreso

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Resumen

Dyadic interactions have become a hot topic of research in both cognitive sciences and philosophy. The perspective we take in such interactions is increasingly regarded as the proper focus to understand basic capacities such as mind reading or evaluative thinking. In this paper we will focus on this perspective from the philosophical side, and we will centre the discussion on four main areas, namely, self-knowledge, theory of mind, reactive attitudes and joint action. We will argue that there is a kind of constitutive, second-personal, authority that others have over a subset of our mental states, a kind of authority that is distinct from, and irreducible to, firstperson authority.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet