Wittgenstein’s Anti-descriptivism

  1. Juan José Acero Fernández
  2. Neftalí Villanueva Fernández
Libro:
VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012
  1. Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
  2. José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
  3. José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
  4. Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
  5. Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)

Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1

Año de publicación: 2012

Páginas: 102-108

Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)

Tipo: Aportación congreso

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Resumen

The aim of this paper is to show that Wittgenstein’s anti-descriptivist approach to the meaning of mental states ascriptions is not restricted to a particular kind of first person mental states attributions –avowals. Our strategy is threefold. We will first provide textual evidence to make it apparent that Wittgenstein’s non-relational treatment of mental states ascriptions is not restricted to avowals. Secondly, we will analyze three different arguments provided by Wittgenstein against the relational nature of mental states ascriptions. Finally, we will develop some ideas to try and make sense of the claim that by using third-person mental states ascriptions we are not describing, but expressing mental states.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet