Dispositions, Affordances and Mental Intentionality

  1. Manuel Heras-Escribano
  2. Manuel de Pinedo-García
Libro:
VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 18-20 July 2012
  1. Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
  2. José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
  3. José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
  4. Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
  5. Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)

Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela

ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1

Año de publicación: 2012

Páginas: 230-235

Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)

Tipo: Aportación congreso

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Resumen

In this paper we defend a bottom-up approach for explaining the ontological grounds of perception and cognition. We start by exploring some consequences of defending a realist conception of dispositions and we accept the thesis that dispositions display ‘physical intentionality’ (PI). Then we show how PI fits within ecological psychology’s understanding of perceptual processes. Further, we defend a normative approach to the mental by which mental intentionality is nothing but rule-following: from a normative perspective there is a small set of dispositions accepted by the community, and this set is what shapes the life and practices of the individual. Finally, we will suggest that an understanding of normativity is enough for understanding consciousness.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet