Logical constanthood
- María José Frápolli
- Raymundo Morado
- Concha Martínez Vidal (dir. congr.)
- José L. Falguera López (dir. congr.)
- José M. Sagüillo (dir. congr.)
- Víctor M. Verdejo Aparicio (dir. congr.)
- Martín Pereira Fariña (dir. congr.)
Editorial: Servicio de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico ; Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
ISBN: 978-84-9887-939-1
Año de publicación: 2012
Páginas: 660-666
Congreso: Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Congreso (7. 2012. Santiago de Compostela)
Tipo: Aportación congreso
Resumen
We defend that the understanding of the role of logic that stems from Frege’s Begriffsschrift is compatible with a deeply pragmatist account of the meaning of logical notions. Our concerns are neither the formal expedients labelled as logical constants in artificial calculi nor the natural language terms that are their standard translations. We on a particular kind of concepts, which are trans-linguistic entities that play a specific role in the conceptual systems of rational agents. Our tentative definition of logical constants is the following: Logical constants are higher-order predicables whose arguments are n-adic predicables (n0), i.e. concepts and propositions. They do not acquire their meaning by referring to extralinguistic entities, neither concepts nor objects, but through the function they perform in representing inferential relations among concepts and propositional contents.