Justification, conversation, and folk psychology

  1. Víctor Fernández Castro 1
  1. 1 PSL Research University, Francia
Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 34

Número: 1

Páginas: 73-88

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.18022 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una versión de la hipótesis conversacional sobre conexión ontogenética entre lenguaje y lectura de mentes (Harris 1996, 2005; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Hughes et al. 2006). Después de argumentar contra una versión particular de dicha hipótesis (Versión Comunicativa), partiré de la visión justificativa de la cognición social (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2004; Zawidzki 2013) para defender que la función primaria de la adscripción de creencias y deseos es la de justificar y normalizar patrones de comportamiento anormales. Tomando en consideración este marco teórico, argumentaré que el desarrollo de las habilidades de lectura de mentes requiere que los sujetos participen en actividades cooperativas y conjuntas mediadas conversacionalmente gracias a las cuales pueden adquirir la capacidad conceptual de adscribir actitudes proposicionales. Después de presentar la versión general de la hipótesis, se presentan diferentes sub-hipótesis susceptibles de ser testadas y estudios empíricos que las refuerzan

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Información de financiación

& I would like to thank Fernando Martínez-Manrique for their valuable comments and suggestions. This paper was written as part of the projects “Inner speech, Metacognition, and the Narrative view of Identity” (FFI2015-65953-P) and “Contemporary Expressivism and the Indispensability of Norma-tive vocabulary” (FFI2016.-80088-P) of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.

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