La racionalidad de las teorías conspirativasUna aproximación desde Max Weber y Raymond Boudon

  1. Alejandro Romero Reche 1
  2. Türkay Salim Nefes 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Granada, España
  2. 2 Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, CSIC), España
Revista:
Revista CENTRA de ciencias sociales: CENTRA journal of Social Sciences

ISSN: 2951-8156,  2951-6641

Año de publicación: 2022

Volumen: 1

Número: 2

Páginas: 11-30

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.54790/RCCS.24 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Revista CENTRA de ciencias sociales: CENTRA journal of Social Sciences

Resumen

Las teorías conspirativas suelen ser percibidas como fenómenos ideológicos irracionales con potencial para producir efectos perniciosos en las sociedades donde se propagan. Esta percepción, reforzada por la visibilidad de los ejemplos históricos en que han legitimado la discriminación de minorías o incluso el genocidio, condiciona el análisis sociológico de las mismas y limita su potencial explicativo cuando parte de una presunción de irracionalidad. Este artículo defiende, por el contrario, una aproximación que parte de una presunción de racionalidad, concebida en un sentido amplio en el que se conjugan la racionalidad instrumental y la racionalidad valorativa. Un enfoque de elección racional así planteado permite una comprensión más completa del fenómeno y, con ella, potencialmente una base más sólida para intervenir respecto a los objetivos normativos a los que no renuncia. El artículo presenta las dos corrientes principales en el estudio sociológico de las teorías conspirativas y muestra cómo ambas podrían conciliarse por medio de un enfoque racional que, frente a la visión restringida de la racionalidad de Pareto, se base en las de Weber y Boudon, explorando su aplicabilidad a trabajos empíricos que relacionan teorías conspirativas con partidismo y religiosidad.

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