Exploring the conceptual structure of Spanish Experimental Psychology

  1. Javier Ortiz Tudela 1
  2. Carlos González García 2
  1. 1 Goethe Universitaet Frankfurt
  2. 2 Universidad de Granada
    info

    Universidad de Granada

    Granada, España

    ROR https://ror.org/04njjy449

Revista:
Psicológica: Revista de metodología y psicología experimental

ISSN: 1576-8597

Año de publicación: 2023

Volumen: 44

Número: 2

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.20350/DIGITALCSIC/15275 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Psicológica: Revista de metodología y psicología experimental

Resumen

The recent incursion of experimental psychology into the arena of cognitive neuroscience has brought attention back to its conceptual foundations. As we embark on more multidisciplinary enterprises, some authors have called to rethink the taxonomy of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to build stronger theories. While some claim that, compared to other disciplines, the ontology of psychology precedes scientific work and has minimally departed from “folksy” terminology, others argue psychology’s explanandum confers a special status to folk insight. Here, we examine which psychological constructs are prevalent in the abstracts of five editions of the SEPEX meeting and compare them with those present in William James’ seminal Principles of Psychology. Additionally, we assess aspects where Spanish’ experimental psychology might fall behind to identify promising, relatively unexplored research avenues. Together, this initial exploration aims at characterizing the current conceptual status of Experimental Psychology in Spain. In a broader sense, we expect to raise awareness on the importance of a robust and up-to-date ontology given the increasingly multidisciplinary field in which our discipline now plays.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet