Rawls y la cultura pública como base de una concepción política

  1. Emilio José Rojas molina 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Salamanca.
Journal:
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez

ISSN: 0008-7750

Year of publication: 2021

Issue: 55

Pages: 75-106

Type: Article

DOI: 10.30827/ACFS.V55I0.15561 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez

Abstract

This paper examines the different objections raised by Rawls’s appeal to public culture as a basis of his conception of justice. That review tries to establish two conclusions. First, against those that suggest that, with the appeal to those foundations, the soundness of the method of justification designed by Rawls suffers seriously and those that argue that, with that appeal, Rawls is giving up the claims of universality which are inherent to the liberal doctrine, it tries to make it clear that the role those ideas play in the justification of a political conception of justice such as his own only shows the consistency that Rawls’s work displays in the way of understanding the nature of justifi-cation and the class of elements it is based on. Second, against those that assert that Rawls’s method of justification results in some form of relativism or ethnocentrism, it attempts to show that this method doesn’t lead to that kind of positions, even if it takes as a basis our considered judgments and fundamental political concepts.

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