Equilibrio reflexivo y justificación: ¿intuicionismo o coherentismo? (en el 50º aniversario de la publicación de A Theory of Justice)

  1. Emilio José Rojas Molina
Journal:
Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho

ISSN: 0214-8676,  2386-4702

Year of publication: 2021

Issue: 44

Pages: 409-441

Type: Article

DOI: 10.14198/DOXA2021.44.16 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR HANDLE: https://hdl.handle.net/10045/114320

More publications in: Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho

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Abstract

This paper examines the conception of justification that the method to which Rawls appeals to justify his principles of justice falls within, one of the methodological questions that more objections has generated. In this sense, it sets out to explain why reflective equilibrium supposes a broadly coherentist account of justification, as well as how the vision that it offers of this seeks to avoid any element of a foundationalist nature. Since foundationalism is the approach to justification that it seems to oppose coherentism most straightly, but some of the criticisms of reflective equilibrium have attempted to present it as a disguised form of intuitionism –the most important version of moral foundationalism–, the paper tries to highlight some of the most significant differences that can be drawn between these two ways of seeing justification. Taking this as a basis, it aims to show why attempts to present justice as fairness as participating in that kind of foundationalism are unreasonable, but, above all, to offer some answers regarding these objections, emphasizing the questions that must be put the focus when evaluating them.

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Data source: Dialnet