Resolución del Conflicto Sirio: Una Aproximación Multi-track a la Mediación de la ONU para Siria (2012-2023)

Abstract

The use of mediation as a tool to peacefully resolve international crises has been common since its explicit inclusion in the international system after World War II. However, the complexity and severity of armed conflicts that have arisen in the last two decades have raised doubts about its ability to facilitate effective political processes leading to successful agreements. This challenge has recurrently manifested itself in conflicts across the North Africa and Middle East region, sparked by the wave of uprisings and demonstrations of the Arab Spring. Specifically, UN mediation in Syria has consistently been deemed an impossible task, with some of the organization's most prominent mediators facing difficulties in addressing the process successfully. For this reason, the overarching goal of this thesis is to analyze the factors explaining the degree of effectiveness in the UN-mediated mediation process for Syria between 2012 and 2023. To address this research topic, the thesis adopts a multi-track approach that distinguishes, on the one hand, Track 1, a negotiation space for political-military elites, and Track 2, generated from two parallel spaces to the political process, inclusive of actors from civil society and women: the Civil Society Support Room (CSSR) and the Women's Advisory Board (WAB). Thus, the thesis (1) examines the behavior of political actors along Track 1 and (2) the influence of these two parallel spaces on the mediation process, specifically Track 1. To achieve these objectives, the thesis employs conflict resolution and international mediation theories as a multidisciplinary framework grounded in political science and international relations. The methodological design utilizes the single case study methods and employs processtracing to examine the hypothesized causal mechanisms. The sources used are based on a database compiled from a total of 47 interviews with members of negotiating delegations from Track 1, mediators, facilitators, and organizers from the CSSR and the WAB, as well as participants from both spaces. The main findings demonstrate that parties in Track 1 have recurrently employed spoiling behaviors, determining the fragility of the process. This fragility is manifested not only in the absence of tangible results, such as the inability to reach a political agreement or the incapacity to curb violence in the country but also in the instability, lack of representativity of Track 1, and the loss of impartiality and unity of action by the mediating structure. Spoiling behavior, conceptualized in two dimensions—indirect and direct—proves to be a key weakening force. The indirect dimension, marked by violent acts and the encouragement of violence by international and regional actors, as well as internal parties, systematically destabilizes mediation initiatives. Violence on the ground, the progressive militarization of the conflict, and the non-compliance with key agreements contribute to the abrupt interruption of mediation efforts, weakening their impact and effectiveness. In particular, the intervention of regional and international actors contributed to intensifying violence and creating a conducive environment for indirect sabotage. In the direct dimension, spoiling behaviors manifest through more subtle yet equally harmful strategies. Selective vetoes in the UN Security Council and the imposition of preconditions by national delegations, have undermined the mediator's ability to act and threatened the representativity of the process. Likewise, the instrumentalization of the process for self-interest, whether by challenging the mediator's impartiality or altering the mediating structure, has weakened the legitimacy and effectiveness of mediation. Competition among mainly Western and Russian governmental agendas undermines unity of action and weakens peace efforts. On the other hand, the CSSR and the WAB generate a variety of outcomes in the form of recommendations, proposals, reports, among others, aiming to strengthen the content of the peace process in general and Track 1 in particular by expanding its limited agenda and promoting greater involvement of civil society and women at the negotiation table. This influence has shown some progress, especially in advancing the inclusion of the peace process. Additionally, both the WAB and the CSSR have globally facilitated the introduction of bottom-up dynamics, challenging the exclusive, limited, and exclusionary narrative of Track 1 and incorporating a broader content into the negotiating agenda. This contrasts with the top-down narrative of a process that, in general terms, lacks an operational agenda due to the limited space for negotiation and is further constrained by not recognizing the multitude of issues that constitute the broader debate initiated by the Arab Spring in Syria. However, the current Track 1, marked by geopolitics and the limited negotiating will of national parties, hinders the effectiveness of the influence of civil society and women, whose proposals to Track 1 are not effectively transferred or incorporated into the political process. Additionally, these spaces lack officially outlined transfer mechanisms that would allow systematic interaction between spaces, compounded by the fact that Track 1 actors have expressed deep resistance to receiving products generated by the CSSR and the WAB.