Elección de managers y comportamiento sancionador en la empresa: un análisis experimental
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1
Universidad Pablo de Olavide
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2
Universidad de Granada
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3
Middlesex University
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ISSN: 0422-2784
Ano de publicación: 2019
Título do exemplar: Economía conductual
Número: 413
Páxinas: 73-84
Tipo: Artigo
Outras publicacións en: Economía industrial
Resumo
This paper analyzes through a public good provision game how the sanctioning behavior of agents varies depending on whether they are democratically elected or not. The experimental setting is applied to a particular case of a company in which the external judges are the managers; voters represent workers; and the public good is the teamwork output which is distributed among workers. The main conclusion is that managers increase their efforts in terms of monitoring and punishment when they are democratically elected.
Información de financiamento
Los autores de este artículo agradecen considerablemente la ayuda financiera proporcionada por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (ECO ECO2016-76789-P).Financiadores
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Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad
Spain
- ECO2016-76789-P
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